University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1985

The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision
of the First Amendment
Philip B. Kurland

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip B. Kurland, "The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First
Amendment," 55 Mississippi Law Journal 225 (1985).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF
THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
PROVISION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT*
Philip B. Kurland**
I.

THE CONSTITUTION, LIKE THE COMMON LAW,

Is

BASED ON

EXPERIENCE

One of the most quoted phrases in legal literature is Oliver
Wendell Holmes's proposition that "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."' Like many of Holmes's wellknown aphorisms, it is usually quoted out of context. He was not
saying, as some would have it, that law reflects only feelings or
ideology rather than reason.' He was rejecting the rigidity of the
syllogism, which tells us how to derive a conclusion from a major
and minor premise, but tells us not how to discover those premises. There are always more than major and minor premises in* Copyright 1984 by Philip B. Kurland.
This article was originally presented as the Tenth Annual Law Memorial Lecture at
the University of Mississippi School of Law in March of 1984. Since 1974, the Law
Memorial Lectures have been supported by the Jackson, Mississippi firm of Butler,
Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, as a memorial to founding members of the firm,
George H. Butler, Sr., Charles B. Snow, and J. Morgan Stevens. Professor Kurland
inaugurated the series in 1974 with Watergate, Impeachment and the Constitution, 45
Miss. L.J. 531 (1974).
** William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago
Law School. A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; L.L.B., 1944, Harvard University;
L.L.D., 1977, University of Notre Dame. A former president of the HARVARD LAW REvIEw, Professor Kurland was law clerk to Judge Jerome N. Frank of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United
States Supreme Court. He has written widely on constitutional issues, and his books
include WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978), POLITicS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT (1970), and FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT (1970).
O.W.HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1938).
" "These philosophers believe that they have burrowed too far into the visceral origins of our beliefs and of all convictions to be fobbed off by the ingenuous assumptions

of a simpler age." L.

HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

207 (2d ed. rev. 1953).
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volved in the framing of law. As Holmes said on that same first
page of The Common Law, "other tools are needed besides logic
.... The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed."' And, he
went on: "The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and
what it tends to become."'4 A knowledge of its history and origins, of what Alexander Bickel once called "the original understanding,"5 is a necessary ingredient in comprehending our present law. The "original understanding" of the first amendment
has generally been romanticized to the end of commanding the
broadest reading of the provision in its application to today's
problems. By revealing its history, however, I make no claim or
assertion that it will afford solutions to our modern difficulties.
History is but one element in the elucidation of the law, and
usually not the most important one.
Holmes, in his famous epigram about the life of the law,
was, of course, speaking about the development of the common
law, a body of rules wholly created by judges in the course of
adjudicating cases and controversies, usually between private
parties. The materials of judicial precedents, unalloyed by constitutional mandate or statutory command, are particularly mal-

3 HOLMES,

supra note 1, at 1.

4Id.

' See Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HAsv.
L. REv. 1 (1955).
' The point of view described here is inextricably linked to the name of Justice
Black, whose view of the first amendment is illustrated by the following representative
statement: "It is my belief that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they
were put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their
prohibitions to be 'absolutes.'" Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y. UNIv. L. REV. 865, 867
(1960). Among other commentaries discussing the amendment in similarly sweeping
terms, see W.O.DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 1-3, 11 (1970)(deploring narrow interpretation); and Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,
256-57 (1961)(amendment requires absolute immunity for all political speech).
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leable. If law school teaches nothing else, it must demonstrate
that precedents are not rigid limitations on judicial judgment
and that the more relevant precedents there are, the less confining they tend to be. Judges relying solely on their predecessors'
efforts from which to derive a governing rule infringe on no one
else's domain when they utilize their own intellectual resources
to shape received doctrine to fit the moods and needs of their
own day. But, as Holmes also said, while judges do create new
rules, i.e., they are legislators, "they can do so only interstitially;
they are confined from molar to molecular motions."'7 And yet,
even in the arena of the common law, where the judge is monarch of all he surveys, it still behooves him in determining the
fitness of earlier decisions to understand the reasons for their
creation and the stages of their growth. Let me use Holmes's
words from The Common Law again:
However much we may codify the law into a series of seemingly self-sufficient propositions, those propositions will be but
a phase in a continuous growth. To understand their scope
fully, to know how they will be dealt with by judges trained in
that past which the law embodies, we must ourselves know
something of the past. The history of what the law has been is
necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.'
(To law students who may read these remarks, I feel it necessary to explain my iterated reliance on Holmes. But I have
discovered that, as I grow older, Holmes seems to grow wiser.
When I was a student, I cherished Holmes for his wit, for his
aphorisms, for his brevity, and for his command of the English
language, surpassed among judges, if at all, only by Learned
Hand and the most able Supreme Court opinion writer of all
time, Robert H. Jackson. But time has taught me that what once
impressed me only as grand style was in fact a capacity for incalled it, in his snobbish fashion,
sights-Holmes
"apercus," 9-that lesser minds, such as mine, could come to appreciate only through experience.)
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
s HOLMES, supra note 1, at 37.
' See M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JusTicE HOLMES 419-20 (1946)(Holmes's
use of the word to convey what he thought of Hegel's philosophy of law).
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Let me remind you again that, in the quotations I have thus
far offered, Holmes was talking about the common law, where
the judges were the voices of the sovereign. At the risk of speaking heresy in today's world of constitutional jurisprudence, I
would suggest that even federal judges, mighty as they are, have
a more limited law-making power in cases involving constitutional or statutory construction. The differences may be hard to
discern simply from a reading of judicial opinions. Using
Holmes's dicta or their equivalent to excuse themselves from
any obligation to reasoning, judges today frequently connect
their answers to the questions only by untold numbers of words
among which some selection might be made by their readers to
find several different explanations-sometimes inconsistent
ones. And usually the most important of these words are "I believe" or some equivalent Jovian expression of personal preference. Perhaps no more than such a personal credo should be required in a common-law case. But surely some obligation is
owed to recognize constitutional provisions and statutory enactments as having greater weight than mere judicial precedents. If
I am not lifting myself by my own bootstraps by referring to the
Constitution itself, I would note that article VI makes the Constitution and the laws of the United States "the Supreme Law of
the Land," 10 without even a nod in the direction of prior judicial
decisions. It took John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison1 to
provide the lever by which judicial dictum became superior to
constitutional or statutory language: a lever utilized far more in
the twentieth century then it was in the nineteenth. Marshall's
phrase, of which the Supreme Court has become so enamored,
was: "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."' 2
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that those of us who do
not share the latitudinarian views of judicial authority represented by my deconstructionist colleagues would reject for constitutional adjudication Holmes's notions of how law is made.
The syllogism is still an inadequate guide, even if one were to
VI, § 2.

'o

U.S. CONST. art.

"

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
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find his major premise in the legislative language. The context in
which it was composed, the problems to which it was addressed,
and the ambiguities of language still call for the kinds of judgments that a common-law judge is called on to make, and more.
Neither the syllogism nor a computer can provide a definitive
answer. Judgment is invoked and judgment is a human function,
not a mechanical one.
Felix Frankfurter, then a justice of fifteen years experience,
once described, for the benefit of the American Philosophical
Society, the demands on a judge whose principle business was
constitutional and statutory construction. He wrote:
A judge whose preoccupation is with such matters should
be compounded of the faculties that are demanded of the historian and the philosopher and the prophet. The last demand
upon him-to make some forecast of the consequences of his
action-is perhaps the heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the
future, to give shape and visage to mysteries still in the womb
of time, is the gift of imagination. It requires poetic sensibilities with which judges are rarely endowed and which their education does not normally develop. These judges, you will infer,
must have something of the creative artist in them; they must
have antennae registering feeling and judgment beyond logical,
let alone quantitative, proof.
The decisions in the cases that really give trouble rest on
judgment, and judgment derives from the totality of a man's
nature and experience. Such judgment will be exercised by two
types of men, broadly speaking, but of course with varying emphasis-those who express their private views or revelations,
deeming them, if not vox dei, at least vox populi; or those who
feel strongly that they have no authority to promulgate law by
their merely personal view and whose whole training and
proved performance substantially insure that their conclusions
reflect understanding of, and due regard for, law as the expression of the views and feelings that may fairly be deemed representative of the community as a continuing society.13
If the Constitution is not a code of laws with a rule to meet
every contingency, neither is it merely a set of moral precepts
13 Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of Supreme Court Litigation, 98 PRoc. OF THE AM. PHIL. Soc'y 233, 237 (1954).
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derived from the political philosophers whom the writers and ratifiers of the Constitution invoked so frequently in their arguments over the merits and demerits of various provisions. The
Constitution' was not, in 1787, a recapitulation of John Locke or
Baron Montesquieu, any more than in 1904 it could be derived
from Herbert Spencer's Social Statics 4 or in the 1970's from
5 so that one cannot simply reJohn Rawl's Theory of Justice,"
sort to the writings of such savants to determine its meaning. As
Felix Frankfurter once said when he was still professing law,
"the Constitution . . . was a response to the practical problems
and controversies of our early history. '16 While it is not sufficient to know what those "practical problems and controversies"
were in order to determine the meaning of the words that were
used, such knowledge can shed some light on how the terms are
to be applied even today. For some, like Mr. Justice Black, "it is
language and history that are crucial factors which influence me
in interpreting the Constitution-not reasonableness or' 7desirability as determined by justices of the Supreme Court.'
Thus, the Constitution can be seen to have been created
largely to resolve two kinds of problems with which the statesmen of the time had more than adequate experience. The first
was the set of abuses imposed on the American colonists and
their antecedents by royal governments. Many of these may be
found detailed in the bill of indictment contained in the Declaration of Independence. I do not mean Jefferson's sonorous
phrases about "self-evident truths." (As law students learn

" H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1851). This book may now be better known to law
students than to the general public, thanks to Holmes's famous statement that the fourteenth amendment did not enact it. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting). But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Spencer's argument against state economic regulation enjoyed tremendous popularity.
Discussions of his influence appear in S. FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE

30-46 (1956); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT passim,
esp. 31-50 (1955); and 3 V.L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 197STATE

211 (1927).
15J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls attempts to use the time-honored
notion of the social contract to support his vision of a society striving to enhance the
position of the materially disadvantaged, subject to provisions guaranteeing "equal liberty" for all citizens.

F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL

THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
FAITH 8 (1968).
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quickly, when a brief or an opinion suggests that a proposition
needs no authority to support it, it usually means that there is
no such authority.) I speak rather of the specific complaints
about such things as trial beyond the vicinage and a judiciary
beholden to the executive.18 The second set of experiences which
engaged the framers in a search for cures were the defects in the
government established under the Articles of Confederation, not
least of which was the incapacity of the central government to
raise funds and to protect commerce among the several states.
The first problems were those of government too strong to preserve the liberties of the people. The second were those of a government too weak to survive. A way had to be found between
Scylla and Charybdis.
Nor were the answers devised by the Constitution writers ad
hoc innovative solutions to perceived problems. Between 1776
and 1787, and even before, the states had experienced self-government of their own, affording examples of how best to deal
with some of the basic issues that confronted the Founding Fathers. An examination of the state charters and constitutions
demonstrates that a very large part of the American Constitution was derivative rather than original, not least in the area of
the Bill of Rights. For example, even before the Declaration of
Independence, the Virginia Bill of Rights asserted that "the
freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and
can never be restrained but by despotic governments."1 9 The
founders did not need to imagine the dangers of allowing the
quartering of troops in private homes. They did not need to
guess at the necessity for a rein on the judiciary through a guaranty of jury trial. Whether true of the common law or not, certainly the creation of the Constitution was based on experience
rather than logic.
18The Second Continental Congress's catalogue of grievances against George III

contains, inter alia, charges that he "made judges dependent on his will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries," and that he consented to laws providing for "transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses ...." The Declaration of Independence, para. 11, 21.
1" Virginia Bill of Rights, § 12 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in 1 H.S. COMMAGER, DocUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 103-04 (9th ed. 1973).
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AMERICAN PRECONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE: THE

BLACKSTONIAN CONCEPT OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

The Constitution was the capstone of a unique political
revolution. The American Revolution was not a contest between
rival political or religious factions seeking hegemony over the
people. Nor was it a contest between economic classes or social
strata, for the American states were-if we ignore the question
of slavery, which is exactly what the Founding Fathers did-still
essentially classless societies. It was a revolution to bring about
self-government in a geographic area of a dimension never
before the subject of democratic or republican rule, self-government that would afford its constituents protection for life, liberty, and property and perhaps, even for the Jeffersonian notion
of "the pursuit of happiness." But, as one of the patron saints of
the new American Government, John Locke had written: "The
business of law is not to provide for the truth of opinion, but for
the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and person."' 0 The restoration of the rights
of Englishmen-including no taxation without representation-was the battle cry of the American Revolution of 1776. By
the time the War of Independence was won, and certainly by
1787 when the Constitution was framed, the rights of Englishmen were probably not enough.
Among the pre-Revolutionary rights of Englishmen was
what was termed "freedom of the press." Since there was no
written constitution in England-there still is none-English
freedom of the press was somewhat amorphous in nature and, in
any event, subject to change at the will of Parliament. The nature of this right was described by David Hume in an essay of
1742, with all his usual enthusiasm for British liberty. In Of the
Liberty of the Press, he wrote: "Nothing is more apt to surprise
a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this
country, of communicating whatever we please to the public,
and of openly censuring every measure, entered into by the king
or his ministers.""1 Hume saw no inconsistency between this
j. LOCKE,
Jo

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 205 (C. Sherman ed. 1937).
D. HUME, 1 ESSAYS MORAL, POLrrICAL AND LITERARY 94 (T. Green & T. Grose ed.
1907).
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right of Englishmen and the "general laws against sedition and
libeling [which] are at present as strong as they possibly can be
made." 2 2 The theme was one that would recur throughout the
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century discussions of the subject: freedom to say what you will, but responsibility for what
was said.2" Is speech or press free when the speaker or publisher
may be held liable in penal or civil sanctions for it? Certainly
the English liberals of the day seem to have thought so.
A point then that should be quickly made is that the Americans were fully conversant with the English law when they were
going about the business of their constitution-making. In this
day and age, when lawyers are so ill used, even by such eminents
as the Chief Justice of the United States2 4 and the President of
Harvard University,2 5 both of whom are members of the profession, I am fond of resorting to Edmund Burke's speech,"On
Conciliation with America," as evidence of the role of the law
and lawyers in bringing liberty to this continent. There Burke
told Parliament:
Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies, which contributes no mean part towards the growth and
effect of this untractable spirit. I mean their education. In no
country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The
profession itself is numerous and powerful; and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent
to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do
read, endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I
have been told by an eminent bookseller that in no branch of
22 Id. at 98 n.1.

See, e.g., Rex v. Shipley, 4 Douglas 73, 170, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 824 (K.B.
1784)(Mansfield, J.)("[t]he liberty of the press consists in printing without any previous
license, subject to the consequences of law"). Lord Ellenborough was of the same mind a
generation later: "The law of England is a law of liberty, and consistently with this liberty, we have not what is called an imprimatur; there is no such preliminary licence
necessary. But, if a man publish a paper, he is exposed to the penal consequences." Rex.
v. Cobbett, 29 How. St. Tr. 1, 49 (K.B. 1804).
4 See, e.g., Address by Chief Justice Burger, A.B.A. midyear meeting (Feb. 12,
1984), printed in 70 A.B.A. JOURNAL 62, 65 (Apr. 1984)(discussing deficiencies of American legal system).
2 See, e.g., Address by Derek C. Bok, Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers for
1981-82, printed in HARVARD MAGAZINE, May-June 1983, 38-45, 70-71 (discussing
problems of American legal system and legal education).
23
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his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many as
those on the law exported to the plantations. The colonists
have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own
use. I hear they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England."
What then was the Blackstonian description of freedom of
the press? In the fourth volume of the Commentaries, published
in 1769, he wrote:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free State; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to
forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press, but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the
press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly
done, both before and since the revolution, is to subject all
freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make
him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points
in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings which,
when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged
of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of
peace and good order, of government and religion, the only
solid foundation of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is
still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object of
legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon
freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is
still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which

society corrects ....

27

The American preconstitutional experience was not dissimilar to that of the English. Here, too, the writers and the courts
treated the notion of freedom of the press as the right not to
have expressions censored before publication. It was as well ac26

E. BURKE, Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliationwith the Colonies,

in 2 WRITINGS
27

AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE

124-25 (1901).

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *152-53.

HeinOnline -- 55 Miss. L.J. 234 1985

1985]

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

cepted-however much we have since sought to mythologize
Cato's Letters and John Peter Zenger-that a free press did not
preclude post-publication prosecutions. And this was true in
states where constitutional provisions had been made to ensure
freedom of the press as well as where the reliance was solely on
the common law. Thus, as late as the year before the Congress
offered the first amendment for ratification, 1788, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania decided Respublica v. Oswald.28 The
Pennsylvania Constitution provided that "the freedom of the
press shall not be restrained" 9 and "that the printing presses
shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any part of the government.""0
Nevertheless, the court ruled that "[t]he true liberty of the press
is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinion; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society, to inquire
into the motive of such publications, and to distinguish between
those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye
solely to the public good, and those which are intended merely
to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible
that any good government should afford protection and
impunity." 31
James Wilson, one of the foremost legal scholars of his time,
later to be a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
had expressed the same views at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention on December 1, 1787, where he said:
I presume it was not in the view of the honorable gentleman to
say that there is no such a thing as a libel, or that the writers
of such ought not to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the
press is not carried so far as this in any country. What is meant
by the liberty of the press is that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible
when he attacks the security or welfare of the government, or
,8 1 Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788).
29

Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5

THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-

3083 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as Thorpe].
30 Pa. Const. of 1776, § 35, reprinted in 5 Thorpe, supra note 29, at 3090.
31 Oswald, 1 Dall. at 325.
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
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the safety, character, and property of the individual.2
These and the other authorities to which I shall refer are not
exhaustive but rather representative of the legal opinion of the
era.
There was controversy in the United States, as in England,
but not over the question whether freedom of the press foreclosed punishment for publication that could not be censored.
The issues that were fiercely mooted were two: should the judge
or the jury determine whether the words used constituted a libel, and could truth be introduced as a defense? Those questions were put to rest in England by Fox's Libel Act of 179111 in
favor of jury adjudication, and in this country to the same result
sometimes by judicial decision,,' sometimes by constitution or
statute, as the terms of the Sedition Act 5 law reveal.
When the first amendment was proposed to the states for
ratification, it was against this background of accepted law. Further enlightment as to its meaning was not forthcoming from the
First Congress by way of legislative history. The usual reliable
sources for construing the original constitution-the debates at
the Federal Convention and at the ratifying conventions, The
3 -all
Federalist" and the Anti-Federalist Paperss
offer some
commentary on freedom of press, but not much that is helpful.
Hamilton's proposition in the eighty-fourth Federalist suggests
that the various state constitutional provisions for a free press
are meaningless and only afford aid and comfort to those who
would prefer to read things into the Constitution rather than to
derive meaning from it. He wrote:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition
82

2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 449 (1861 ed.).

33 An Act to Remove Doubts Respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel,

1791, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60.
See, e.g., Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 271, 2 Am. Dec. 402, 406 (Pa.
1805)(jury shall determine whether publication constituted libel); State v. Lehre, 2 Brew.
446, 446, 4 Am. Dec. 596, 596 (D.C. 1811)(jury decides whether statement was libelous as
well as fact questions concerning publication and truth).
31 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, 1 Stat.
596 (1798)(expired 1801).
36 THE FEDERALIST (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1888).
17

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981).

HeinOnline -- 55 Miss. L.J. 236 1985

1985]

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold
it to be impracticable, and from this I infer, that its security,
whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution
respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and
on the general spirit of the people and of the government.3 8
Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, when returning his
comments on the proposed first amendment, expressed views
more in keeping with the Blackstonian notion of the concept.
"[T]he following alterations and additions would have pleased
me," he wrote to Madison. "The people shall not be deprived of
their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything
but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or
reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy
with foreign nations." 89 Surely this was less of a license than
even Blackstone's definition would afford. If his federalist foes
could have known of it when they were locked in battle with him
over the Alien and Sedition Laws, how they would have thrown
it in his face. But his proposed emendation had come too late to
effect a change in the language of the amendment, even though
it was to find some echoes in the law as it later developed.
Thus was the attitude toward the "liberty" of publishers at
the time of promulgation of the first amendment forbidding
Congress to make any law "abridging the freedom of the press."
I have spoken only about freedom of the press, largely because it
was freedom of press and not of speech that was the concern of
the colonists and their heirs. Insofar as speech was a problem, it
tended to be subsumed under the religious question, which is a
different but not necessarily separable provision of the first
amendment. I have not tried to parse the words used by the
First Congress. For, as an erudite word-monger once wisely said:
"The great difficulty for historians is to find out what a certain
sentence really meant in a particular year. Nothing is as unstable as speech; misunderstanding of what an earlier generation
really meant is so easy as to be almost inevitable." 0

" THE FEOERALIST No. 84, at 537-38 (A. Hamilton)(Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1888).
89 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 7 WRITINGS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 450 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
40

BRYHERK DAYS OF MARS 51 (1972).
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Rather, let us undertake a pragmatic exegesis of the meaning of "freedom of press" as explicated in the controversy over
the Alien and Sedition Laws and what followed.
III.

THE SEDITION LAW CRISIS: PRESS FREEDOM AS AN ISSUE

The great constitutional crisis of the Federalist period surrounded the Alien and Sedition Laws and was in part-if only in
part-concerned with the meaning of the first amendment. The
Sedition Act of July 14, 179841 was, indeed, of broad scope,
providing:
SEC. 2. That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious writing ...

against the government of the United States, or either house of
the Congress of the United States, or the President of the
United States, with intent to defame the said government, or
either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to
excite against them . . .the hatred of the good people of the

United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States,
or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or
resisting any law of the United States.

.

.or to aid, encourage

or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the
United States, their people or government, then such person
being thereof convicted before any court of the United States
having jurisdiction thereof shall be punished, .. ..4'
The issues that had vexed the English and American courts in
criminal libel cases, whether evidence of truth could be offered
in defense and whether judge or jury were to determine whether
the published language constituted a libel, were resolved in favor
of defendants by section 3:
That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the
writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for
the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence
in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause,
' An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, 1 Stat.
596 (1798).
42

Id. § 2.
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shall have the right to determine the law and the fact, under
the direction of the court, as in other cases.4"
That the Alien and Sedition Laws were purposeful political
machinations by John Adams and his cohorts, aimed at the Jeffersonian press and the Republicans' francophile partisans cannot be gainsaid." That the statute trampled civil liberties, few
doubted. Whether the powers asserted went beyond what the
Constitution allowed was a more difficult question. The reaction
of the Jeffersonians was strong. The Kentucky" and Virginia4 6
Resolutions, drafted respectively by Jefferson and Madison, asserted that there was no constitutional authority in Congress to
enact these laws and that, as parties to the Constitution, the
states had the right to reject laws that were inconsistent with
the terms of the compact. These two states called on their sister
states to join them in declaring the statutes ineffective and commanding the representatives in Congress to withdraw them. This
was one of the three or four major crises in our history in which
some of the states sought to assert rights as contracting parties
to the Constitution. They all failed. 4' The 1787 Constitution was

3 Id. § 3.
" For discussions of the historical context of the Alien and Sedition Laws, see J.
MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION AcTs 26-32 (1951)(detailing Federalists' fear of Republican newspapers) and J.M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 11-13 (1956)(discussing Federalists'
fear of "Jacobinism"). For the partisan application of the laws, see R. BuEL, SECURING
THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN PoLrICS 1789-1815 235-36 (1972)(asserting that
Federalist judges and officials used the laws against Jeffersonians).
15 Resolutions of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, November 16, 1798 [hereinafter cited as Kentucky Resolutions], reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 540-45 (1836 ed.).
" Resolutions of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, December
24, 1798 [hereinafter cited as Virginia Resolutions], reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
528-29 (1836 ed.).
" See, e.g., M. SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 1801-1815 296-99 (1968) (discussing Hartford Convention of 1814-1815, at which delegates called for "parochialism
and privilege" and maintained that "unconstitutional federal acts should be countered
by the states to shield their citizens"); G. DANGERFIELD, THE AWAKENING OF AMERICAN
NATIONALISM 1815-1828 13-15, 279-83, 299-300 (1965) (controversy surrounding Tariff of
1816 and Tariff of 1828); and G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848 71-80
(1959) (discussing South Carolina's 1832 Ordinance of Nullification, which declared that
"we [the People of South Carolina] will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act
. . .to coerce the State.. .to be null and void [and] inconsistent with the longer con-
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not a compact between the states but among the peoples of the
states. That is what made it unique.
It must be remembered that the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions were promulgated several years before the Supreme
Court first declared a national statute to be unconstitutional4 8 so
that the road of state proclamation seemed more certain to the
Republicans than a course of action through the courts. John
Marshall, even then, however, suggested that the issue be
presented for resolution in the federal courts.4 9 Both sides to the
controversy knew that the national courts were largely manned
by strong Federalist judges who could be predicted to support-as they ultimately did-the actions of the Federalist Congress and the Federalist President.5
The pleas of Kentucky and Virginia to their sister states
were rebuffed. They brought about complete rejection of the notion of a power of nullification and, for some, a clear affirmance
of the validity of the Alien and Sedition Laws. Delaware,5 1
Rhode Island, 52 Massachusetts,5 3 New York, 5 ' Connecticut, 55
New Hampshire, 6 and Vermont, 7 through their legislatures, all

").
tinuance of South Carolina in the Union . .
48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4" See J. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 304-07 (1974).
50 See Miller, supra note 44, at 135-39 (entire federal bench joined crusade against
"Jacobinism"); M. SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 64-67 (1968)(judiciary remained
federalist bastion well into Jefferson's administration).
5' Resolution of the Delaware General Assembly, February 1, 1799, reprinted in 4
ELLIOT's DEBATES 532 (1836 ed.)("very unjustifiable interference with the general
government").
5' Resolution of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, February [n.d.], 1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 533
(1836 ed.)(General Assembly expressed concern over "many evil and fatal consequences
which may flow" from passage of Viginia Resolutions).
*' Resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, February 9, 1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 533-37 (1836 ed.)(legislature refused to
sanction the Virginia Resolutions for fear "the Constitution would be reduced to a mere
cipher.").
" Resolution of the Legislature of New York, March 5, 1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIO'S DEBATES 537-38 (1836 ed.)("inflammatory and pernicious sentiments").
55 Resolution of the General Assembly of Connecticut, 2d Thursday of May, 1799,
reprinted in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 538 ("deep regret ... explicitly disavows the principles" espoused in Virginia's opposition to Alien and Sedition Acts).
" Resolution of the General Court of New Hampshire, June 14, 1799, reprintedin 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 538-39 (1836 ed.)("state legislatures not proper tribunal" to adjudicate

HeinOnline -- 55 Miss. L.J. 240 1985

19851

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

responded by chastising Virginia and Kentucky-rather than
the national government-for their actions.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that free speech and
press was the central feature of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Their principal arguments were that the United States
had only delegated powers,58 that these powers were not enhanced by the "necessary and proper" clause, 59 indeed, that the
limitation on national powers reserving powers over seditious libel was particularly preserved by the tenth amendment.6 0 Thus,
the Kentucky Resolutions asserted that "libels, falsehood, and
defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld
from the cognizance of federal tribunals."'6 But they also
claimed that aliens came within the protection of the states and
that the President could be given no power of deportation, especially without jury trial.2 (These positions, of course, have since
been stood on their heads by the Supreme Court.) 3
The Alien and Sedition Laws, however, certainly roiled the
nation. Congress spent much time on the question, generally
showing no more objectivity in its debates than did the press,
which violently took sides pro and con, depending on their loyalties to the rising fortunes of the Jeffersonians or the declining
ones of the Federalists. To review the entire debate would be
inappropriate here. " But the controversy did evoke some of the
best advocacy our learned forefathers ever produced-not least
constitutional questions).
11 Resolution of the General Assembly of Vermont, October 30, 1799, reprintedin 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 539 (1836 ed.)("unconstitutional in their nature, and dangerous in
their tendency").
See Kentucky Resolutions, No. 1, supra note 45, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
at 540 (federal act void unless power expressly delegated by states); Virginia Resolutions,
supra note 46, reprinted in 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES at 528 (federal government lacks powers
beyond those specifically enumerated).
59 See Kentucky Resolutions, No. 6, supra note 45, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
at 540 (liberal construction of necessary and proper clause subverts entire instrument).
'0 Id., No. 3, reprinted in 4 ELLIoT'S DEBATES at 541.
61 Id.
02 Id., Nos. 4-6, reprinted in 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES at 541-42.
" See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891)(federal government has plenary power over alien affairs); see also Zakonaite v. Wolfe, 226 U.S. 272, 275
(1912)(Congress may delegate power of deportation to executive branch; not criminal
proceeding, so no trial necessary).
" For detailed treatment, see Smith, supra note 44, at 112-30.
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by John Marshall, soon to be the great nationalist jurist, and by
James Madison, the most astute politician our nation has ever
produced. A few quotations will suffice to give both the flavor
and substance of the arguments insofar as they related to the
issue of freedom of the press.
Marshall drafted the report of the minority on the Virginia
Resolutions. The report had every bit of the style and command
that was later to grace his constitutional opinions as Chief Justice of the United States:
To constitute the crime, the writing must be false, scandalous, and malicious, and the intent must be to effect some of
the ill purposes described in the act.
To contend that there does not exist a power to punish
writings coming within the description of this law, would be to
assert the inability of our nation to preserve its own peace, and
to protect themselves from the attempt of wicked citizens, who
incapable of quiet themselves, are incessantly employed in devising means to disturb the public repose.
Government is instituted and preserved for the general
happiness and safety; the people therefore are interested in its
preservation, and have a right to adopt measures for its security, as well against secret plots as open hostility. But government cannot be thus secured, if, by falsehood and malicious
slander, it is to be deprived of the confidence and affection of
the people. It is in vain to urge that truth will prevail, and that
slander, when detected, recoils on the calumniator. The experience of the world, and our own experience prove that a continued course of defamation will at length sully the fairest reputation, and will throw suspicion on the purest conduct. Although
the calumnies of the factious and discontented may not poison
the minds of a majority of the citizens, yet they will infect a
very considerable number, and prompt them to deeds destruc65
tive of the public peace, and dangerous to the general safety.

So much for the tenth amendment. Marshall turned to the
meaning of the freedom of the press which the first amendment
"6The Address of the minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People of that
State, containing a Vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws,
Journal, Virginia House of Delegates (Dec. 1798), reprinted in JOHN P. ROCHE, JOHN
MARSHALL: MAJOR OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS

42-43 (1967).
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said should not be abridged. His emphasis was on the word
"abridged":
If by freedom of the press is meant perfect exemption from all
punishment for whatever may be published, that freedom
never has, and most probably never will exist. It is known to
all, that the person who writes or publishes a libel, may be
both sued and indicted, and must bear the penalty which the
judgment of his country inflicts upon him. It is also known to
all that the person who shall libel the government of the state,
is for that offense punishable in a like manner. Yet this liability to punishment for slanderous and malicious publications,
has never been considered as detracting from the liberty of the
press. In fact the liberty of the press is a term which has a
definite and appropriate signification, completely understood.
It signifies a liberty to publish, free from previous restraint,
any thing and every thing at the discretion of the printer only,
but not the liberty of spreading with impunity false and scandalous slanders, which may destroy the peace, and mangle the
reputation, of an individual or of a community.
If this definition of the term be correct, and it is presumed
that its correctness is not to be questioned, then a law punishing the authors and publishers of false, malicious and scandalous libels can be no attack on the liberty of the press.6
James Madison relied heavily on the limited powers of the
national government, 7 on rejection of the common law being
any part of the national law,68 on a false but tempting equation
between the religion clauses and the speech and press clause,6 9
and on the difference in the form of government between England and the United States as justification for a difference in the
law. 70 He gave the game away, however, when he made clear that
what he was objecting to was trial of offenders under federal law
in the federal courts by federal judges appointed by the very
President who had invoked the Alien and Sedition Laws to be" Id. at 46-47.
See Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4

67
BATES

546-50 (1861 ed.).

" Id. at 561-67.

6 Id. at 571.
70 Id. at 569-70.
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gin with, and by juries drawn by Federalist marshals. He acknowledged that published slanders were subject to sanction in
state courts in which freedom of the press was equally sacrosanct under constitutional provisions.7" Calumniators of the national government, it was implicit in his argument, would receive
more sympathetic treatment in the state courts which were not
beholden to the American President. In his Address on the Sedition Law, Madison said:
It is vicious in the extreme to calumniate meritorious public servants; but it is both artful and vicious to arouse the public indignation against calumny in order to conceal usurpation.
Calumny is forbidden by the laws, usurpation by the Constitution. Calumny injures individuals, usurpation, States. Calumny
may be redressed by the common judicatures; usurpation can
only be controlled by the act of society. Ought usurpation,
which is most mischievous, be rendered less hateful by calumny, which, though injurious, is in a degree less pernicious?
But the laws for the correction of calumny were not defective.
Every libellous writing or expression might receive its punishment in the State courts, from juries summoned by an officer,
who does not receive his appointment from the President, and
is under no influence to court the pleasure of Government,
whether it injured public officers or private citizens .... 71
The contest then was not so much over the freedom of the
press from punishment for the publication of libels as between
the appropriate realms of the state and national governments.
This was the first big battle over the necessary and proper
clause as a multiplier of the powers specified in the first seventeen clauses of article I, section 8. The next one would come
with the Bank of the United States, when Marshall would put
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court on the expansive reading
of the necessary and proper clause for which he contended in the

" Id. at 570-71. Madison argued that Congress should make laws only where it has
the specified power to do so or else the judiciary will not be able to control Congressional
authority. Madison, supra note 67, at 568.
71 Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth
of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799), reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 334 (G. Hunt ed.
1906).
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battle over the Alien and Sedition Laws. 1
Madison, did, however, make a solid point about the logical
deficiency in an interpretation of "the freedom of the press"
which barred only prior restraint but not consequent punish-

ment. In his Report on the Virginia Resolution he wrote:
The freedom of the press under the common law, is, in the
defences of the Sedition Act, made to consist in an exemption
from all previous restraint on printed publications, by persons
authorized to inspect or prohibit them. It appears to the committee, that this idea of the freedom of the press, can never be
admitted to be the American idea of it, since a law inflicting
penalties on printed publications, would have similar effect
with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would
seem a mockery to say, that no laws should be passed, preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be
passed for punishing them in case they should be made."4
Of course, such a distinction was not unknown to the common law, which denied power to enjoin criminal acts before they
were committed but did not prevent their punishment after the
event.7 5 But that was hardly a satisfactory answer to the
Madison objection that the practical effect of threatened punishment could be as stifling of free expression as a prior restraint.
The writings of the time do not seem to have dealt with the
question, although the rule against prior restraint does suggest a
distinction between publication, which is to be free, and the consequences of publication, for which the writer or publisher may
be held responsible.
Recently there was celebrated the twentieth anniversary of
the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 76 certainly a landmark decision in the development of the
law of the first amendment. In that decision, the Court sugSee McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
"' Madison, supra note 67, at 569.
75 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825)("The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case
of its abuse; like the right to keep firearms, which does not protect him who uses them
for annoyance or destruction.").
71

7 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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gested that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional ab initio."
But that conclusion was as devoid of reason as it was of authority. That the Act should be declared unconstitutional if it were
reenacted tomorrow takes little clairvoyance. But, unlike the rulers of Oceania, even in 1986, neither we nor our judges have any
legitimate authority to rewrite history to our liking. As of the
Federalist period and beyond, court after court sustained and
applied the Blackstonian reading of the meaning of freedom of
the press. 78 (It should be remembered that the statute itself by
its terms became ineffective two years after its enactment, so
that if the Jeffersonians wanted similar protection for themselves from a vicious press, they would have to frame their own
law to that end. The Jeffersonians did not do so. They were perfectly satisfied with the relief that could be had in the state
tribunals under state laws, especially since the federal judiciary
continued to be manned by Federalist judges long after the Federalists were replaced by true-blue Virginians in the national executive, first by Jefferson, then by Madison, and then by
Monroe. The Jeffersonians tried but failed to displace the Federalist -judges: the removal of Samuel Chase by impeachment
narrowly failed in the Senate.7 9 But it did put the fear of the
new gods even into Marshall himself. Jefferson did all he could
by pardoning those whom the Federalists had convicted and remitting their fines.80 )
"' Id. at 276.
78 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson County Attorney, 283 U.S. 697, 720
(1931)(possibility that freedom of press may be abused does not make immunity from
prior restraint any less needed; subsequent punishment for abuse is proper remedy); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)(purpose of freedom of press is to prohibit
prior restraint but not to prohibit subsequent punishment); Dailey v. Superior Court of
City and County of San Francisco, 44 P. 458, 459-60 (Cal. 1896)(California Constitution
provided that there could be no prior restraint on right to free speech, but speaker was
responsible for abuse of that right); Ex parte Neill, 22 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App.
1893)(Texas Constitution granted one freedom to write or publish his opinion on any
subject, but he accepted responsibility and punishment for such publication if proved to
be improper).
79

The impeachment of Justice Chase is described in 2 H. ADAMS, A HISTORY

UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

OF THE

147-59 (1962).

For a detailed treatment from a different perspective, see 1 W. C. BRUCE, JOHN RANDOLPH
OF ROANOKE 200-21 (1922). Randolph, as Republican floor leader, managed the impeachment effort.
80 See Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 WRITINGS OF
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Nor is there any doubt of the partisanship of the federal
judges in administering the Sedition Law. 8 Nevertheless, it is
clear that the judicial opinions of the time accepted Marshall's
explication of the meaning of the freedom of the press clause in
the first amendment.82 And, however appealing the principles
sought to be invoked in their defense, there can be little doubt
that the roster of defendants in these cases was made up of rascals, rogues, scamps, and scalawags, publishers whose sentiments
were for sale to the highest bidder.8 3 But we are no less grateful
to John Wilkes for his contributions to our liberties because he
was a reprobate and sinner of no mean proportions.8 4 So, too,
those convicted under the Sedition Law wear the laurels of
history.
That the Marshallian notion of the meaning of freedom of
the press continued to prevail long after the controversy over
43-46 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
0' See J. MILLER, supra note 44, at 136 ("crusade" of federal bench); M. SMELSER,
supra note 50, at 70 (Chase described as "the Jeffreys of the Sedition Act prosecutions"
because of his unrestrained partisanship). See generally SMrrH, supra note 44, at 189-417
(detailed accounts of individual cases).
" See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (1788)("The true liberty
of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinions; but it is
due to the peace and dignity of society to enquire into the motives of such publication,
and to distinguish between those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an
eye solely to the public good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible that any good government should afford
protection and impunity.").
"' J.M. Smith recounts the stories of these worthies in his book, supra note 44. They
include Benjamin Bache, who reprinted certain letters the British had forged during the
Revolution to discredit Washington, id. at 189, and James Callender, "one of the leading
scandal-mongers . . . of the day," id. at 335-36. Nor should we forget Luther Baldwin.
After being told that a twenty-one gun salute was being fired in honor of John Adams, he
remarked that he "did not care if they fired through his a__." He was prosecuted for
seditious libel. Id. at 270-76.
'"John Wilkes became notorious for making scurrilous attacks on King George III
and his ministers through his journal, the North Briton. The general tone of Wilkes'
writings may be inferred from his charge that George III's friend and prime minister, the
Earl of Bute, was having an affair with the King's mother. But Wilkes' prosecution for
seditious libel was based not on this but on his charge that Bute's successor, Grenvile,
had caused the King to lie in his speech proroguing Parliament in 1763. Justice Charles
Pratt (later Lord Camden) ordered Wilkes discharged a week after his arrest because of
the government's unlawful use of general warrants. A good account of this affair can be
found in R. J. WHITE, THE AGE OF GEORGE III 62-80 (1969). For a more dramatic account
THOMAS JEFFERSON

of Wilkes' character and career, see R. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES (1929).
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the Sedition Law had died is evidenced by another phenomenon,
the provisions in the newly emerging state constitutions. It will
be recalled that the early provisions, such as that in the Virginia
Bill of Rights, extolled the values of freedom of the press in the
broadest terms.8 5 The Maryland Constitution of 1776 and the
Delaware Declaration of Rights of the same year, for example,
used equally extravagant language: "That the liberty of the
press ought to be inviolably preserved. ' 86 When the new constitutions came to be written, the importance of a free press was no
less emphasized, but the Blackstonian qualification and that of
the Sedition Act itself were specifically written in. For example,
the Kentucky Constitution of 1799, with the heat of the controversy over the Sedition Law still little abated, provided in article
X:
Sec. 7. That printing-presses shall be free to every person
who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature
or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to
restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts
and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
Sec. 8. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in
all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and
the facts, under the direction of the court, as
87
in other cases.
IV.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

There are, indeed, lessons to be learned from the history of
the origins of the freedom of press clause of the first amendment. And the first of them is that suggested in New York
8 See supra text accompanying note 19.

86Md. Const. of 1776, § 38, reprinted in 3 Thorpe, supra note 29, at 1690; Del.

Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 23,

DEL. CODE ANN. (1974).
87 Ky.Const. of 1799, §§ 7-8, reprinted in 3 Thorpe, supra note 29, at 1289 (empha-

sis added).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, that the focus of the amendment was on
seditious libel. 88 Indeed, there is very little to the historical record that was not concerned with justifying the constitutional restraint in terms of the necessity for allowing dissemination of
information about government and providing criticism of government behavior. It was protection of political speech that was
the objective to be served by the free press clause. And this was
all the more necessary for government which was republican in
form, where "we, the people" were sovereign, and the government only a means to self-rule.
It does not follow, of course, that the first amendment went
beyond prevention of prior restraint. There is no substantial evidence that criminal libels were intended to be freed from consequent sanctions. Except when the wish becomes father to the
thought, as it does so often in the writings of Supreme Court
Justices and law professors, the first amendment was not in its
origins the expansive license it has since become. Grateful as we
must be for the improvements that the Court has made in the
Bill of Rights, we must give the credit-and the blame, if there
is any-where it is due, not to Madison and his confreres who
framed it but to the Justices of the Supreme Court, who, while
making the proper genuflections to history, frequently observe
its teaching more in the breach than in the observances.
It must be remembered, however, that the Justices of the
Supreme Court are not today composing a Constitution for 1787
or 1789 to forestall the evils of those days. They are extrapolating new principles from old to frame a Constitution to guard
against the tribulations of our own time. I regret only that they
do not go about their tasks with the honesty that their high office demands. Better they should tell us what they are really
about than to pretend they are merely the voices of the great
men who originally composed the document now entrusted to
their care.
It is a long time from yesterday to today. Since 1789, the
earth has spun on its axis more than 70,000 times; the earth has
SB

See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 273-76 (Sedition Act of 1798, in its suppres-

sion of free public discussion, created a "national awareness" of the significance of the
first amendment).
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made its orbit around the sun almost two hundred times. But
the revolutions within our society during this time are countless.
We have learned things about the need for a free press that none
could have foreseen when provision for it was made in the first
amendment. Government is no longer a handful of men in a national or state capital. And the news media is not a few small
letterpresses available to vent the spleen of any who would hire
them. Government is a giant octopus with its tentacles everywhere in the lives of the citizenry. And the media are sprawling
empires of highly technical machinery that are at least as pervasive in their direct effects on our lives. The contest between government and press for control of our lives makes us grateful that
they are adversaries. Should they join forces, what freedom we
have left should be certain to perish. It would be a mistake to
assume that one is hero and the other villain. The freedom-seeking man must look askance at both.
Listen to the words of warning of Judge Learned Hand, delivered in 1942, before World War II was resolved, in his tribute
to Mr. Justice Brandeis, and see if you find no analogy to our
own problems:
[T]he day has clearly gone forever of societies small enough for
their members to have personal acquaintance with one another, and to find their station through the appraisal of those
who have any first-hand knowledge of them. Publicity is an
evil substitute, and the art of publicity is a black art; but it has
come to stay; every year adds to its potency and to the finality
of its judgments. The hand that rules the press, the radio, the
screen and the far-spread magazine, rules the country; whether
we like it or not, we must learn to accept it. And yet it is the
power of reiterated suggestion and consecrated platitude that
at this moment has brought our entire civilization to imminent
peril of destruction. The individual is as helpless against it as
the child is helpless against the formulas with which he is indoctrinated. Not only is it possible by these means to shape his
tastes, his feelings, his desires and his hopes; but it is possible
to convert him into a fanatical zealot, ready to torture and destroy and to suffer mutilation and death for an obscene faith,
baseless in fact, and morally monstrous. This, the vastest conflict with which mankind has ever been faced, whose outcome
still remains undecided, in the end turns upon whether the in-
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dividual can survive; upon whether the ultimate value shall be
this wistful cloudy, errant, You or I, or that Great Beast, Leviathan, that phantom conjured up as an ignis fatuus in our
darkness and a scapegoat for our futility. 89
And that, too, is a lesson of the history of the origins of the
first amendment, the commitment to freedom for the individual.
And we know now, better than they knew then, that freedom for
the individual consists no less of freedom of thought than freedom of action. As Mr. Justice Jackson once told us: "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 90 He
told us this in what remains one of the great first amendment
opinions of our times, the second Flag Salute Case. It was in
that case, too, however, that he afforded an explanation of the
meaning of the rule against prior restraint, although he was
speaking in broader terms. He said there:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
That is exactly the way that the freedom of the press clause
was read by its initiators. It removed all questions of the right to
publish from the discretion of government censors. It left the
question of the propriety of punishment for abuse of the privilege to the judicial process with the full panoply of protections
afforded by the concepts of the rule of law and due process, including trial by jury.
You may, at this time, feel like Winston Churchill when
once served with a not untypical English pudding that seemed
to have neither form nor substance. He reportedly beckoned the
waiter and said: "Pray, take this pudding away. It has no
theme." Alas, I cannot take back what I have already proferred.
8' L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172-73 (2d ed. rev. 1953).
'o

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

9 Id. at 638.
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But perhaps I can make its outlines a bit more certain.
What then are the lessons that might be learned from the
history of the origins of the first amendment? The clearest is the
least palatable, for it is the opposite of what our nine masters
purported to learn from that history in 1964.92 It is that freedom
of press did not preclude punishment of seditious libel, but only
its prior restraint.
The Founding Fathers taught us more than this, however.
Jefferson would have us learn that newspapers were an extraordinarily important element in the self-government on which the
new nation had embarked. There were times when he embarked
on hyperbole, first on one side of the question and then on the
other. Thus, he wrote to Edward Carrington on January 16,
1787:
The people are the only censors of the governors: and even
their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of the
institution. To punish these errors too severely would be to
suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to
prevent these irregular interpositions of the people, is to give
them full information of their affairs through the channel of
the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should
penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. 3
On the other hand, in a letter to John Norvell in 1807, his
euphoria for the press was more than a little dampened. There
he wrote:
It is a melancholy truth, that a suppression of the press could
not more completely deprive the nation of its benefits, than is
done by its abandoned prostitution to falsehood. Nothing can
now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself be" See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270-277 (criticism of government and officials was permitted as necessary to first amendment right of free communication).
" Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (June 16, 1787), in 6 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 57-58 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
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comes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle. The
real extent of this state of misinformation is known only to
those who are in situations to confront facts within their
knowledge with the lies of the day. I really look with commiseration over the great body of my fellow citizens, who, reading
newspapers, live and die in the belief, that they know something of what has been passing in the world in their time;
whereas the accounts they have read in newspapers are just as
true a history of any other period of the world as of the present, except that the real names of the day are affixed to their
fables . . . no details can be relied on. I will add, that the
man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than
he who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is
nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehood and
errors. He who reads nothing
will still learn the great facts, and
4
the details are all false.9
It should be remembered that, however often Jefferson is
cited as condemning the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws, it was basically because, like Madison whose words I
have already quoted, he thought the subject beyond the ken of
the national government, not because newspapers were beyond
chastisement by government for what they published. In the
Kentucky Resolutions themselves, Jefferson wrote that it was for
the States to determine "how far the licentiousness of speech,
and of the press, may be abridged without lessening their useful
freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated
from their use, should be tolerated rather than the use
destroyed. .

..

"95

For all his talk about freedom of the press, it must be
remembered, too, that, both as Governor of Virginia and as
President of the United States, Jefferson found prosecution of
his political enemies for criminal libel to be a wholesome endeavor. Thus, he wrote to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania, in
1803: "[A] few prosecutions of the most prominent offenders
would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the

Letter, Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 11, 1807), in 11 WRrriNs
224-25 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
,6 Kentucky Resolutions, No. 3, reprinted in 4 ELLio's DEBaATs at 541.

THOMAS JEFFERSON
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presses."9 6
This, however, need not denigrate the Jeffersonian idea that
the necessity for freedom of the press rested on the need for
government to be subjected to the severest scrutiny by its critics
who were to inform the public of its behavior. Neither for Jefferson any more than for Madison were men angels. Those in government were no more to be trusted than those in trade. (Only
small farmers were likely to be virtuous.) 97 Some of the wisest
men in America in those times-and some even today-regard
government as a necessary evil. A system of checks and balances
within government was an essential means of avoiding concentration of power. The press was but a part of this system, reporting directly to the sovereign people. Who was to watch this
watchdog? Obviously that was to be the role of the judiciary-the state judiciary if Jefferson and Madison were to have
their way.
Benjamin Franklin, the patron saint of the American press,
frequently referred to alternatively as the wisest and most dangerous man in America, did not look kindly on the inclination of
the press to claim a privilege to pass judgment with impunity on
any and all, a claim not unlike the one later made for it by Mr.
Justice Black."" In 1789, shortly after he helped make the Constitution of the United States possible by his mere attendance at
the framing convention, Franklin published a satirical paper
that deserves your enjoyment in toto. I extract here a small
item:
If by the Liberty of the Press were understood merely the Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please: But if it
means the Liberty of affronting, calumniating, and defaming

" Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), in 8 WRMNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 218 (P.L. Ford ed. 1897).
97 The classic expression of Jefferson's agrarianism occurs in Notes on
Virginia:
"Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen
people, whose breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue." T. JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in 2 WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
229 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
9' See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 296 (Black, J., concurring)(giving press
privilege to criticize officials with impunity).
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one another, I, for my part, own myself willing to part with my
Share of it when our Legislators shall please so to alter the
Law, and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my Liberty of
Abusing others for the Privilege of not being abus'd myself."

There were other concerns about the press. Some were worried about the subservience of the press to the government. For
example, an anti-Federalist wrote to John Wilson in 1787: "It is
an easy step from restraining the press to make it place the
worst actions of government in so favorable a light, that we may
groan under tyranny and repression without knowing from
whence it comes." 100
We learn from this history, too, that the founders were con-

versant with laws that protected speech not only from censorship but from post-publication sanctions. Thus, in affording
such protection to Congress in the Constitution, they provided
for an absolute, not a conditional, privilege: "for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place." 10 ' The common law also spoke in terms of freedom
of speech when it was affording absolute protection and not
merely prepublication immunities. Thus, as James Burgh put it
in his Political Disquisitions in 1775: "In a petition to parliament, a bill in chancery, and proceeding at law, libellous words
are not punishable; because freedom of speech and writing are
indispensably necessary to the carrying on of business."'0 2 But
these protections, whether of legislators or petitioners, or litigants, were accepted as special, not general, rules of free speech
and press, i.e., speech or writing could not invite government
sanctions if exercised in the conduct of government affairs. Indeed it was this special license to government activity that precipitated in part the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which, twenty years ago brought the law of libel under the
9 B. Franklin, An Account of the Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania,
viz., the Courts of the Press (Sept. 12, 1789), reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 502 (F. Mott & C. Jorgenson ed. 1936).
I00 Letter, "Cincinnatus" to John Wilson, New York Journal, Nov. 8, 1787, cited in
J. T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 160 n.72 (1961).
'0' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1.
102 3 J. BURGH, POLITICAL DiSGUISITIONS: OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS AND ABUSES

bk. I, ch. IX, at 247 (1775).
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umbrella of the first amendment, 10 3 although its implications are
still not completely resolved.
This history also teaches us that there was a patent if not
necessarily real anomaly in providing that a person may publish
what he chooses, but that government may punish him for what
he published. Perhaps the answer to the anomaly lies in the fact
that the doctrine of prior restraint distinguishes between publication, which cannot be inhibited, and injuries resulting from
such publication, for which sanctions can be invoked. But shifting the emphasis of constitutional scrutiny to the effects rather
than the words did not come to the forefront of first amendment
theory until Holmes formulated his "clear and present danger"
doctrine, 1 at which modernists now tend to sneer, but which
may remain the only principle on which first amendment theory
may ultimately be rationalized.
Perhaps the clearest teaching of the history of the origins of
the first amendment is the lesson I already quoted from Hamil'0 See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 264-66.
104 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The defendants challenged
their conviction for distributing literature directed toward disrupting the selective service process in violation of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. Id.. at 48-49. The defendants' claim to first amendment protection fell upon deaf ears as Justice Holmes wrote
the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justifying this impingement upon freedom of expression as being in the interest of national security Holmes stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree.
Id. at 52. Schenck was followed closely by two other cases where the Court upheld the
conviction of defendants under the Espionage Act of 1917. Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). However, Holmes's clear
and present danger doctrine did not receive any significant notice until 1927 in Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). For a discussion on the evolution of the clear and
present danger doctrine, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From
Schenck to Brandenburg and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 42-44 (1969); Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 325, 356-95 (1952); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-FromSchenck to Dennis, 52 COLO. L. REV. 313 (1952);

J. NOWAK,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

874-86 (2d ed. 1983).

106 See Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514,
584-94 (1981)(influence of Zachariah Chafee upon the development of the clear and present doctrine after Schenck, Frahwerk and Debs); Gunther, Learned Hand and The Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 735-41 (1975)(Judge Hand was critical of Justice Holmes's clear and present
danger doctrine at its inception, viewing it as an impingement on free speech).
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10 6 Freedom of the press will rest
ton's eighty-fourth Federalist.
not on words in a constitutional document, but on a mood of
tolerance that will ebb and flood, probably at its lowest when
our need for it is greatest, when we do not feel as secure as we
should like to feel. For, as Learned Hand once put it:

I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court
can even do much to help it. While it lies
there it needs no
10 7
constitution, no law, no court to save it.
And this explains the importance of freedom of press and speech
in a free society. The spirit of liberty, about which Hand was
speaking, will be nurtured by freedom of ideas and communication of those ideas, or it will perish from lack of sustenance.
If, however, a free press is a necessary, it is not a sufficient,
condition to a free society. The McCarthy Era, the Vietnam
War, the imperial presidency were as much the creatures of the
press as the objects of their scrutiny. And we still lack the means
of making the press both free and responsible. Until it becomes
responsible as well as free, there is always the danger that the
price of its freedom will be our freedom. But responsibility for
the press, like responsibility for the courts, i.e., responsibility for
fulfilling their functions competently and honestly, cannot be
imposed from outside. And, as each of us knows from his own
experience, self-restraint, unaided by external force, is the most
difficult of achievements.
But, the reader might think, the pudding has still not
gelled. All I have reported of the origins of the first amendment
remains a disorganized glop. Well, perhaps that is the nature of
the pudding, and neither we nor Winston Churchill should have
expected more. To recur once more to Learned Hand,
Nor need it surprise us that these stately admonitions refuse to
subject themselves to analysis. They are the precipitates of
'0" See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
'07 L. HAND, THE Spmrr oF LIBERTY 189-90 (2d ed. rev. 1953).
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'old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago,' originally
cast as universals to enlarge the scope of victory, to give it authority, to reassure the very victors themselves that they have
been champions in something more momentous than a passing
struggle. Thrown large upon the screen of the future as eternal
verities, they are emptied of the vital occasions which gave
them birth, and became moral adjurations, the more imperious
because inscrutable, but with only that content which each
generation must pour into them anew in light of its own
08
experience. 1
Perhaps, then, all we can learn from this history of the origins of the first amendment is how little history has to teach us
by way of particular solutions to the particular problems of our
own day, problems that history never faced and, so far as I can
discover, never contemplated. At least, this study should make
us skeptical of the prepackaged histories that we are constantly
offered to prove that our side of the controversy is on the side of
history or vice versa. Such history tends to be selected as legal
precedents are selected, for their rhetorical rather than their
substantive values.
Benjamin Franklin said when he emerged from the 1787
Convention, and was asked the nature of the new government:
"A republic, if you can keep it." 10 9 Whether future generations
of Americans can keep it depends on them, not on Franklin, or
Jefferson, or Hamilton, or Madison. I am sorry to predict that
the job will be an even harder one than theirs was.

Id. at 163.
Papers of Dr. James McHenry of the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 Am. HIsT.
REv. 595, 618 (1906).
'08
'0'
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